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1. Introduction. 
  
Terrorism has become a grave threat in modern Russia. To protect the rights 
and freedoms of its citizens the state has not only the right but also an obligation to 
put up an effective fight against terrorism. However, the actions undertaken by 
Russia’s authorities in the Chechen Republic and Northern Caucasus since autumn 
1999 under the banner of struggle against terrorism cannot be defined as a 
counterterrorism operation (CTO). The ways the top management and military 
agencies of the country use force have transformed the CTO into criminal acts 
resulting in mass victims and outrageous violations of human rights.  
It should be noted, though, that throughout the period of 1996-99, the heads of 
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) proved to be unable to ensure safety and 
civil rights on the territory under their administration. They failed to stop brigandage, 
robbery and hostage taking on the adjacent territories by the gangs based in the 
Chechnya. Incursion by the armed formations into Dagestan from the territory of 
Chechnya in August and September 1999 could not but make the leadership of the 
Russian Federation take measures aimed to ensure citizens' safety and protection of 
the constitutional order. Such was the situation that made the use of the armed force 
lawful; however, force should be used within the limits of the law, selectively and 
proportionate to the threat. 
During all the seven years of confrontation, both parties badly violated human 
rights and norms of humanitarian law. However, the number of casualties among 
civilians resulting from the actions by the federal center is considerably higher, while 
the policy pursued by the federal authorities in the Northern Caucasus erodes Russia’s 
democratic institutes as a whole. 
  
In this report, we are not going to touch upon the line of action of the armed 
formations fighting the federal party or describe numerous acts of terrorism 
committed by the adversaries of the Russian Federation in the ChR territory and other 
regions of Russia. These actions cannot be justified and deserve to be censured. 
The report briefly describes the line of actions by Russia’s security agencies in 
the Northern Caucasus with respect to their observance of human rights and norms of 
humanitarian law. To emphasize, the internationally recognized authority of the 
Russian Federation, i.e. the state that has signed numerous international legal 
documents and assumed respective obligations, controls these security agencies which 
are responsible for gross and massive violations of human rights..  
  
  
2. Background of the Second Chechen War and History of the Conflict 
Development. “Chechenization” of the Conflict.  
  
Initially the ChR conflict was of purely separatist nature. The forces having 
come to power in the Republic in 1991 on the crest of the anticommunist wave 
advocated complete separation of the Chechen Republic from Russia. 
In 1994, the RF leadership started the first Chechen war under the slogan of 
“reinstating the constitutional order”. After the August 1996 military defeat of Russia, 
Moscow and Groznyy signed a number of agreements. The final solution of the 
Chechen issue was postponed for several years; the Republic actually became 
independent. 
During 1996-1999, the situation was inevitably approaching a new 
confrontation. The RF leadership was openly preparing to gain revenge. The 
leadership of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) failed to cope with the post-
war anarchy. Numerous armed gangs made the Chechen Republic their home 
kidnapping people both in Chechnya and in the adjacent territories of Russia. 
Fundamentalist Islamic groups created training bases where they trained volunteers in 
the methods of subversive and terrorist war in the territory of the Chechen Republic. 
In summer and autumn of 1999, groups of Muslim fundamentalists raided into 
the Republic of Dagestan from the territory of the Chechen Republic. There they met 
with a resounding rebuff of the significant part of the population and the RF military 
forces. Having routed the armed intruders and forced them to retreat the Russian 
armies entered into the Chechen Republic. This was the beginning of “the second 
Chechen war”. The Russian authorities called it “counterterrorism operation”, the 
reason for such a definition being a series of terrible acts of terrorism – exploded 
apartment houses in the Russian cities in September 1999. Despite of the statements 
made by the Russian leadership that these acts of terrorism had been authored by the 
terrorist underworld controlled from the Chechen Republic, it remains unclear as to 
who had organized these explosions. 
The period of October 1999 through spring 2000 was the time of the first stage 
of war when Russia’s troops using the armored warfare, aircrafts, heavy artillery and 
missiles gradually occupied the ChR territory. 
By the summer of 2000, the Chechen squadrons were unable to offer open 
resistance to the Russian troops and started using guerilla tactics. This period was 
characterized by creation of the "filtration" system and illegal places for holding in 
custody the detained persons, by the growing activity of “death squads”, numerous 
large-scale "special operations" in towns and villages and, as a whole, by extreme 
non-selectivity in the federal troops’ and security structures’ activities. 
The year 2003 became a new stage in the conflict – beginning of the 
“chechenization”. The RF authorities declared that with the confrontation being over, 
the Republic was returning to the RF legal space and the process of political 
settlement. In fact, the "settlement" became a mere facade for the continuing conflict 
having changed its forms. The Republican authorities were formed through imitation 
of elections in the course of “chechenization”. In the course of conflict 
“chechenization” during the last three years, there were formed security structures 
staffed by local residents, i.e. ethnic Chechens. Along with the local militia, there 
have been formed specialized Chechen formations delegated the "right" to illegal 
violence in their fight against insurgents. 
These are the forces fighting now against insurgents and their underworld. At 
the beginning, the major part of these formations had no legal status but, by the end of 
2006, their overwhelming majority had been already legalized and formally ranked as 
a subunit of some federal security agency. Many of these groups’ members are people 
with a criminal record; the groups are organized based on the clan principle and 
consist of former insurgents compelled by force or blackmail to join their former 
adversaries. Their formal inclusion in the lawful structures has in no way made them 
act within the law. 
During the “chechenization”, the large-scale “special operations” in towns and 
villages were replaced with the “targeted special operations” (kidnappings, actually) 
organized mainly by the local security structures (in some cases jointly with the 
federals). The kidnapped people simply “disappear”; they are kept in illegal prisons 
without any court rulings being coerced to confess to the “committed” crimes. The 
thus obtained “confessions” are often used for the invention fabrication of criminal 
cases. Up to 40% of the kidnapped persons “disappear” without any traces; sometimes 
people find their corpses. The practice of taking hostage of insurgents’ family 
members aimed to compel them to surrender has become widely spread.  
Thus, the forces undertaking the “CTO” gradually switched in their actions 
from extreme non-selectivity to relative selectivity. However, all these actions are 
undertaken with gross violations of human rights in the situation of complete legal 
vacuum.   
It is necessary to note another characteristic of the “CTO”: with the level of 
military opposition in the ChR going down, the armed conflict has started “spilling 
over” the territory of the Chechen Republic to other republics in the Northern 
Caucasus.  
  
  
  
3. Legal Framework 
The legal framework for evaluating the actions of the parties to the conflict is 
the international pacts and conventions on human rights; international humanitarian 
law; Russia’s national legislative norms. 
  
The military campaign launched in the Chechen Republic in autumn 1999, as 
well as the first Chechen military conflict was beyond the scope of the law. The issue 
in question was actually a large-scale abuse of power by the state. 
To justify their actions the RF authorities referred to the need to fight against 
terrorism and used the term “counterterrorism operation”. However, when 
characterizing the events taking place in Chechnya, the officers of the coalition task 
force in the Northern Caucasus and civil functionaries often used the word "war". 
This is true, because during the armed hostilities the troops blocked whole regions, 
stormed towns and villages, used aircrafts, heavy artillery, tanks and missiles. 
There are different opinions regarding the legitimacy of use of armed forces 
(weapons and army) in such situations. From our point of view, the use of armed 
forces is possible as a matter of principle, but strictly within the law of the Russian 
Federation.  
Russia had no law on the defense emergency at that point. When devising the 
operation in Chechnya, the government might substantiate the bringing of troops to 
Chechnya, from the point of view of Russia's current law, as use of armed forces and 
armament for the purpose beyond their intended role. According to the Federal Law 
(FL) “On Defense”, the use the RF armed forces in the accomplishment of missions 
beyond their intended role is allowed by the RF President with issuance of the special 
decree subject to approval by the Federation Council (FC); no such decree was issued. 
Under the RF Constitution, the President can impose the state of emergency in 
the whole territory of the country or in some of its regions in order to ensure safety of 
citizens and protect constitutional order. 
The RF law “On the State of Emergency” was approved in 1991, but was used 
neither in the first nor in the second Chechen campaign.  
At first, those who opposed the imposing of the state of emergency in 
Chechnya insisted that the use of this law was impossible as, in the first place, it 
disagreed with the RF Constitution of 1993. Secondly, it did not provide for the 
participation of the army in the actions aimed to normalize the situation delegating 
this mission to the internal security troops. 
Indeed, the Law “On the State of Emergency” of 1991 did not quite address 
the potential state of emergency that would justify the support participation of the 
armed forces in the maintenance of the state of emergency. However, by the spring of 
2001, the new Federal Law on the State of Emergency was approved with all the 
norms conforming to the provisions of the Constitution, which makes it possible to 
use the armed forces for the protection of the constitutional order, rights and liberties 
of man and citizen. The majority of the reasons justifying the state of emergency, as 
listed in the new Law, can be found in Chechnya: armed mutiny, acts of terrorism, 
blocking or occupation of certain regions, preparation of and activity in illegal armed 
formations. However, the authorities still did not impose the state of emergency in the 
Republic.  
It is obvious that the President’s unwillingness to take advantage of the Law 
On the State of Emergency can be explained by the fact that both the former and the 
current laws rather clearly and consistently outline the legal aspect of the state of 
emergency. The law demands that, in his decrees with regard to the imposing or 
prolonging of the state of emergency, the President provide a precise list of the 
temporarily restricted rights and freedoms of citizens and identify the state bodies 
responsible for the implementation of specific measures in relation to the state of 
emergency defining the authority limits of these bodies. The presidential decrees is 
subject to approval by the Federation Council. Finally, the law itself imposes a 
number of restrictions aimed to avoid arbitrariness in the public officials’ activities. 
All this made the executive authorities unhappy. This situation resulted in the 
uncontrolled arbitrariness in Chechnya with the constitutional rights of citizens being 
limited, which is permissible only in the state of emergency: 
-         freedom of movement (the restrictions are effective even at present, 
mainly, in the mountainous regions) was de facto cancelled; 
-       towns, villages and even the whole ChR territory were blockaded. 
Russian citizens were restricted in their opportunity to get to Chechnya 
during the time of special operations; people were regularly disallowed to 
go to and from certain towns and villages (blockading of communities is 
presently undertaken only in extreme cases, access to the Chechnya 
territory is practically open for Russian citizens); 
-         vehicles on the roads are subject to arbitrary checking; 
-         the curfews were imposed de facto by the orders of commandants, while 
the authorities insisted that the there was no curfew but just a kind of 
"restriction of movement for vehicles and citizens during certain time” 
(this kind of restrictions has been presently cancelled); 
-         the vehicles that did not stop on demand were subject to fire for effect 
without prior warning; 
-       the prosecutors permanently practice unauthorized searches in people’s 
houses: the people carrying out such actions do not produce any 
documents and do not introduce themselves; 
-         offices of commandants  having large powers in relation to civilians 
have been opened and are still functioning in towns and villages. 
  
To justify this arbitrariness, the federal authorities resort to the extralegal and 
broad interpretation of laws having declared the military conflict a “counterterrorism 
operation”. Such operations were regulated by the RF “Law On Struggle Against 
Terrorism”, which appeared very convenient for the executive authorities as it 
allowed to restrict the rights of citizens in the “zone under the CTO” and involve the 
RF armed forces (“for the purposes beyond their intended role”) to perform the CTO 
without any parliamentary or other kind of control. 
The strict legal analysis shows that under the provisions of the “Law On 
Struggle Against Terrorism” the actions undertaken in Chechnya could not be 
qualified as CTO. Thus, art.3 of the Law “On Struggle Against Terrorism” stated that 
“The zone where the CTO can be performed can mean a separate locality, or water 
area, vehicle, building, structure, construction or premise and the territories or water 
areas adjoining them, within which the specified operation takes place”. From this 
statement, it follows that the zone where the CTO is performed is limited, and cannot 
cover thousands of square kilometers of the territory of one or even several republics 
at the same time. It is equally true that a CTO is aimed to suppress a specific act of 
terrorism and is respectively limited in time. Any other interpretation would be 
arbitrary and loose making senseless the very concept of the act of terrorism as of a 
specific crime. 
Under the “Law On Struggle Against Terrorism”, the CTO could be 
performed only in case the acts of terrorism had already taken place or were under 
preparation according to the available information. 
In spring 2006, a new Russian Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” was 
passed and came into force. The new law was basically adapted to the realities of the 
already implemented CTO in the Northern Caucasus. In particular, the new law did 
not stipulate for any territorial limitations of the CTO zone. 
Description of a punishable offense provided in paragraph I, art. 205 of the 
RF Criminal Code and in the “Law On Struggle Against Terrorism” defines terrorism 
as an action accomplished “for the purpose of violation of public safety, intimidation 
of the population or rendering influence on decision-making by the government 
authorities”, as well as potential threat of such actions intended for the same purposes. 
The purpose, in this case, is treated as the major constituent element of the act of 
terrorism. Lack of such an element presupposes absence of the given crime. This is 
the element that makes terrorism different from similar criminal offences, such as 
forcible seizure of power, subversive activity, participation in the informal armed 
formations, etc.  
Thus, only some of the acts by the armed formations’ members resisting the 
federal forces in Chechnya can be qualified as terrorism. This means that the CTO can 
be aimed only against the persons committing this kind of crimes. Should the federal 
forces strictly follow the law, they could perform certain local-scale CTO within one 
big military operation in the Northern Caucasus. In reality, those resisting the federal 
forces in the declared large-scale CTO are no terrorists at all.  
Thus, the authorities wrongfully used the “convenient” Law on Struggle 
against Terrorism intended for the regulation of local and rather limited in space and 
time operations, which, respectively, did not contain any clearly formulated long-term 
guarantees of human rights protection in the CTO zone. As a result, the security 
officials’ actions were practically uncontrolled and their arbitrariness was in no way 
restricted. 
The lack of precise legal definition of the situation is, in some cases, to the 
disadvantage of the security officials. Thus, the commandants’ powers are ambiguous. 
Being formally responsible for the assurance of order in the region, they cannot even 
have different subunits of the Ministry of Defense (MD) and the Ministry of Interior 
inform them about the “special operations” they undertake in towns and villages. 
The legal nihilism of Russia’s authorities resulted in grave consequences.  
  
  
4. Non-selective use of force 
  
At the first stage of the second Chechen campaign, during the large-scale 
military conflicts, federal troops everywhere resorted to massive and non-selective 
bombings and shell attacks. To kill several insurgents, the army oftentimes sacrifices 
dozens and hundreds of innocent civilians. Like in the first Chechen war, the federal 
forces used armament, which was obviously not intended for selective targeted 
killings. Let us take a few examples.  
The use of “U-target” assault missiles with cluster warheads stuffed with 
pellet bombs used in the center of Groznyy on October 21, 1999, was widely covered 
in mass media. One missile exploded in the Central market, which led to numerous 
casualties. Two other missiles blew up near the maternity hospital and the central post 
office. About one hundred forty persons died and over two hundred were injured. The 
overwhelming majority of the killed and wounded people were innocent civilians. 
On October 27, 1999, the Russian TV reported that the house of the well 
known Chechen commander and terrorist Shamil Basayev located in Lenin Street in 
the city of Groznyy had been blown up by missile. At the same time, mass media 
failed to mention that this blow razed the house next to it, that Basayev was safe, 
while the subsequent bombing destroyed several neighboring residential quarters. It 
was impossible to establish the number of innocent civilians killed. 
Air strikes were aimed against vehicles moving along the roads and any 
groups of people near the roads. Thus, on October 28, 1999, near the village of Stary-
Atagy the funeral procession of the sixty-five-year-old Tamara Chankaeva and her 
twelve-year-old grand daughter having been killed during the bombardment of 
Groznyy was air-attacked by two planes. One person was killed, five – wounded, the 
bus - burnt and six cars – damaged.  
In none of such cases, none of the responsible military officials was held 
criminally liable and no one was punished. Four complaints telling about the innocent 
civilians wounded and killed because of the non-selective actions of the Russian 
federal forces became matter at issue at the European Court on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Only after the complaints were communicated to the EHCR, the Russian 
organs of the Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal cases on these cases, which were 
later on closed “due to the lack of elements of crime in the cases”.  
Thus, Medka Isayeva, Zina Yusupova and Libkan Bazayeva submitted to the 
ECHR their complaints against the actions of Russia’s air forces having air-attacked a 
column of refugees who tried to leave the ChR on October 29, 1999. On September 
29, the ministries and departments of the Ministry of Interior in regions and republics 
received a telephone messages from the decision makers of the federal armed forces 
“Zapad” [West] with the order to close the administrative borders for the people 
trying to leave the ChR. Only Ruslan Aushev, President of the Republic of Ingushetia 
(RI) refused to obey this order. As a result, crowds of people made for the RI running 
away from the military activities taking place in the ChR. However, on October 22, 
1999, federal forces completely blocked the administrative border between the ChR 
and the RI forbidding civilians to cross the border. On October 26, 1999, the Russian 
mass media reported that “humanitarian corridor” going via the checkpoint of 
“Caucuses-1” on the Rostov-Baku highway was to be opened . Thousands of people 
and hundreds of vehicles agglomerated on October 29 on this highway but the 
checkpoint never opened that day.The vehicles turned round and made back for 
Groznyy. Near the village of Shaami-Yurt the column was suddenly attacked from the 
air and dozens of people were killed and wounded. 
Zara Adamovna Isayeva from the village of Katyr-Yurt also submitted a 
complaint to the ECHR on the death of her relatives killed during the firing. Starting 
with February 2000, the federal forces’ commanders several times reported that at the 
end of January 2000 they had performed, in absolute secrecy, an operation aimed to 
get the Chechen squads out of Groznyy. The Chechen commanders had been falsely 
informed that the insurgents could buy from the Russian soldiers a safe corridor from 
Groznyy to the mountains, the latter paid the money for the corridor but on their 
supposedly “safe” way, they came across minefields where the Chechen groups 
suffered significant losses. Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed during that 
operation. The corridor for the supposed exit of the insurgents went via the villages of 
Alkhan-Kala, Zakan-Yurt, Shaami-Yurt, Katyr-Yurt and Gehi-Chu. As the groups of 
insurgents were entering these villages, they were blocked by the federal troops, air-
bombed and raked with artillery fire. At  the same time, no “humanitarian corridors” 
had been provided to the innocent citizens for them to have a safe way out. On the 
night of February 3-4, 2000, the insurgents entered the village of Katyr-Yurt, earlier 
declared by the federals a “safe zone”. In the morning of February 4, artillery fire and 
bombing were brought down onto the village. To villagers had not been given the 
opportunity to leave the village before the firing and there were no properly 
organized  “humanitarian corridors” for them. By different estimations, from several 
dozens to over one hundred civilians were killed that morning.  
On October 14, 2004, the ECHR held public hearings on the above described 
cases and on February 24, 2005, it passed decisions in favor of the applicants 
recognizing Russia guilty of the violation of art. 2 (right to life) and art. 13 (right to 
effective means of protection) of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECPHRFF).  
Regarding the blows brought onto the column of refugees in the village of 
Shaami-Yurt, the ECHR was ready to recognize that if the planes had been attacked 
by the illegal armed formations (as the Russian party insisted) the use of the lethal 
force might have been justifiable. However, even in the case like this, it was obvious 
that the “army had used extremely powerful weapon for the achievement of its 
purposes and all the people being at this moment on the road were exposed to mortal 
danger. <…> The Court cannot agree that the operation at the village of Shaami-Yurt 
had been planned and performed with due care of the life of civilians”. 
As to the blockade and fire attack of the village of Katyr-Yurt, from the ECHR 
decision it follows that the military operation commanders had not undertaken 
necessary actions to notify the civilians regarding the forthcoming fire attack of the 
village and had not provided them with the opportunity to leave the village before the 
firing, while the operation had been planned in such a manner that human losses were 
unavoidable. From the materials of the criminal case presented to the Court by the 
Russian party, it follows that generals V. Shamanov and Ya. Nedobitko were 
responsible for the planning and direct command of the operation. At present, the 
military procuracy organs have resumed the investigation of the criminal cases on the 
facts of civilians’ death at the village of Shaami-Yurt and in the village of Katyr-Yurt 
but until now, no one has been held criminally liable. 
Besides the rulings of the ECHR with regard to the RF disproportionate and 
non-selective use of force and failure to take necessary measures in order to protect 
innocent civilians, the Court specifically emphasizes that no effective investigation of 
these tragic cases has been undertaken: “The Court was amazed by the series of 
serious and inexplicable omissions and inactivity of investigatory bodies”. 
In the decisions on the “Chechen” cases the ECHR in no way challenged the 
legitimacy of struggle against informal armed formations and repeatedly stated its 
understanding of the difficulties inevitably confronted by the state when counteracting 
the armed separatism: “The situation that took place in Chechnya at that time 
demanded that the state undertake exclusive measures to resume its control of the 
republic and to suppress  illegal armed hostilities of the insurgents”. At the same time, 
the Court insisted on the necessary protection of the rights and interests of innocent 
civilians.  
  
Large-scale armed conflicts had stopped by the summer of 2000; however, 
federal forces continued, although in rarer cases, using non-selective attacks in towns 
and villages. Here are some of the examples of different years. 
On the night of October 10-11, 2001, the village of Duba-Yurt suffered 
bombardment: six villagers including children were wounded, three houses destroyed, 
ten houses badly damaged. 
On the night of November 8-9, 2001, after the attack by insurgents on the 
reconnaissance group of the armed forces, residential quarters in the town of Argun 
were exposed to bombardment and shelling. As a minimum, eight persons died, 
dozens of people were wounded; many houses were destroyed. 
On August 20, 2003, the village of Serzhen-Yurt underwent bombardment. 
Zulay Akberdayeva, 36-year-old mother of five children, was badly wounded. 19 
houses in the village were damaged, one house was destroyed. 
On October 2, 2003, at midday, apartment houses in the streets Tsentralnaya 
and Sadovaya, the village of Makhety underwent firing. Aset Haladovna 
Suleymanova, 75, was killed; five persons, including children of six and two, were 
wounded. 
On April 8, 2004, the far away farm of Rigakhoy located high in the 
mountains, Vedensky district, was exposed to air strike; the bomb fell onto the house 
of Imar-Ali Damayev. Practically the whole family died: wife – Maidat Kudusovna 
Tsintsayeva, born in 1975; children – Djanacy, 1999, Zharadat, 2000, Umar-Haji, 
2002, Zara, 2003, Zura, 2003. 
The family of Kagermanovs, village of Serzhen-Yurt, Shalinsky district, was 
killed on June 26, 2004, because of direct hit in their house of the artillery shell: Lema 
Vakhayevich, 1955, his wife Rashana, 1963, daughters Kheda, 1986, and Zhamilya, 
1987. 
On December 3, 2004, the small village of Tazen-Kala in the mountains of 
Vedensky district, suffered artillery firing. Because of the direct hit of shell in the 
Suleymanovs’ house, Saidan Shamsudinovich Suleymanov, 1988, was killed; Said 
Shamsudinovich Suleymanov, 1982, and Zareta Shamsudinovna Suleymanova, 1986, 
were wounded; the house was burned to the ground. All the villagers having remained 
alive left the village afterwards.  
  
Sometimes, the firings of communities were deliberate. 
Thus, on January 14, 2005, helicopters bombed and missile-struck the village 
of Zumsoy and its vicinities in Itum-Kalinsky district before the air landing, although 
there were no insurgents in the village and no one put up any resistance to the landing 
troops. The house of old man Akhmud Tamayev was completely ruined, three houses 
were partially destroyed.  
  
More often, such firings are a result of errors, negligence or drunkenness. The 
army sometimes pays the victims some money for the caused damage; several 
military men were put on probation. 
On September 27, 2005, at 3.00 a.m. the village of Dzhalka and its vicinity in 
Gudermes district were exposed to artillery firing four times with short breaks. Ten 
shells fell within the village boundaries; by good fortune no one was killed; several 
houses were damaged.  
On November 9, 2005, at 3.00 a.m. the village of Stary-Atagy, Groznyy 
district of the ChR, was exposed to firing. Six villagers were wounded; three houses 
were damaged. 
  
Recently, villages in mountainous regions of the Republic have also become 
exposed to firings from the air. 
On December 1, 2006, about 13.30 two missiles launched from the battle-
plane hit the home house belonging to the family of Gaytemirovs on the farm of 
Surokh, Shatoysky district; Roza Akhilgova, 1962, Alikhan Gaytamirov, 1990, and 
Adlan Gaytamirov, 1988, as well as 22-year-old Zalpa Akhilgova were wounded. The 
employees of the military procuracy assured the head of the family Umar Gaytemirov 
that before the beginning of 2007 he would be paid 97 thousand rubles as 
indemnification for the damage of his house and premises. After the New Year, 
Alikhan and Adlan was promised to be paid 100 thousand rubles as compensation for 
the caused physical harm, while Roza and Zalpa were not eligible for any 
compensation because the  family, ostensibly, could not receive more than 200 
thousand rubles.  
  
  
  
5. Deliberate Attacks on Peaceful Population 
  
Quite often actions of the military could be characterized as demonstration of 
retaliation aimed against civilians. It could be artillery firing of residential quarters, 
kidnapping of locals, mass robberies, etc. Actually, one can speak about acts of terror 
against peaceful population 
Here are some examples from different periods of the “CTO”. 
  
On November 21, 2000, a military vehicle was mined on the road near village 
Davydenko: one soldier was killed, two – were wounded. Soon after, soldiers 
detained the resident of the village of Davydenko Khusseyn Gaziyev before the very 
eyes of the passengers in the regular bus, put a sack on his head, took him into their 
armored troop carrier and took away in unknown direction. On November 24, 
Khusseyn Gaziyev's corpse was found at the village outskirts. The corpse had its nose 
cut off and eyes put out; on the neck one could see a deep knife trace, the top of the 
head was mashed, hands and fingers were broken 
On December 11, 2000, near the village of Mesker-Yurt the military column 
consisting of several dozens of ordinary and armored combat vehicles was exposed to 
firing. After that, the military opened fire in the direction of the market and the village 
near the road – several civilians were killed and wounded. The soldiers also detained 
and took away several dozens of the persons whom they picked at random. Later, 
several of those arrested persons were found killed. 
On March 15, 2001, after the mining of the Russian armored vehicle near the 
village of Novogroznensky, soldiers perpetrated a massacre in the village and killed 
eight innocent villagers. 
On October 16, 2001, on the road near the village of the Duba-Yurt, field 
engineers found land mines. After that, the village was exposed to small arms and 
mortar firing. The firing resulted in wounding of a woman and her five-year-old 
daughter who later on died in the hospital.  
On November 29, 2001, in the town of Urus-Martan a suicide bomber 
approached a group of soldiers with the commandant of the district and exploded the 
bomb that she had under her clothes. The commandant and two soldiers were killed. 
During December 2001, the federal security structures blew up in the towns and 
villages of the Urus-Martan district several houses belonging to the families of those 
whom they suspected of having connections with insurgents. Before exploding the 
houses, they forced the people out of their homes. Several men from these families 
were detained and taken away in unknown direction. The corpses of four of those 
having been taken away were found later with traces violent death. 
On January 8, 2002, a Russian soldier was mined on the road between the 
villages of Chiri-Yurt and Novy-Atagi. The colleagues of the victim randomly picked 
three residents of the nearby villages of Stary and Novy-Atagi. Next day, the 
disfeatured corpses of two villagers from Stary and Novy-Atagi – Ruslana Shaipova 
and Mayora Musayeva were found at the outskirts of the village. On January 17, the 
locals found the third corpse of the 16-year-old villager from Novy-Atagi. 
On February 12, 2002, Russian armored vehicle was mined near the village of 
Tsotsin-Yurt; two soldiers were killed, three – were wounded. The same evening, the 
peripheral part of the village underwent artillery firing, which resulted in the death of 
man and woman (Saydali and Lyuba Davletkayevs), another woman (Zareta 
Davletkayeva) and her two-year-old child were wounded. 
On May 14, 2003, an act of terrorism took place in the village of Ilisin-Yurt: 
some explosive blew up amidst the crowd near the head of the ChR administration. 
Shakhidat Baymuradova happened to be among those killed. Mass-media hurriedly 
called her a suicide bomber. However, most likely, she had nothing to do with the 
explosion. On the night of May 17, in the village of Bachi-Yurt, Kurchaloyevsky 
district, some unrecognized armed people rushed into the house of the Baymuradovs 
and shot down two sons, daughter and brother of Shakhidat. 
  
No one has ever been punished for such “acts of retaliation”. 
Oftentimes, the whole villages were exposed to “special operations” as 
measure of retaliation. 
  
  
6. "Special Operations [zachistka]” 
The slang word “zachistka” is used both by the representatives of federal 
forces and by the local residents. It designates an operation when a village or town is 
blocked and, without any sanction from the public prosecutor or any witnesses, 
soldiers search houses one after another and detain all suspicious people. Officially 
“zachistka” is called a “special operation aimed to check people’s residence permits 
and identify participants of illegal armed formations”. 
  
No legislative instruments regulate such special operations. Moreover, 
continuous searches in people’s homes without any sanctions from public prosecutors, 
arbitrary detentions of people, holding them in the places that are not stipulated by the 
law directly contravene the RF legislation. 
All this is aggravated by frequent cases of violence against local residents - 
beatings and robberies that take place during such “zachistkas”. Quite often 
“zachistkas” entailed murders of innocent civilians, tortures and “disappearance” of 
the arrested persons. The examples of such “zachistkas” are numerous. 
The “zachistkas” in the village of Alkhan-Yurt (December 1999), 
Staropromyslovsky district on the city of Groznyy (January-February 2000), village 
of Novy-Aldy (February 2000) were the most covered by mass media events that took 
place during the large-scale battle actions.  
Thus, in Novy-Aldy and the adjacent district of the city of Groznyy, 56 
innocent civilians including old men, women and even a one-year-old baby were shot 
down on February 5, 2000. The ECHR passed its decision on October 12, 2006, under 
the complaints of the relatives of the people killed in the district of the city of 
Groznyy adjacent to Novy-Aldy (the case of “Estamirovs versus Russia”). Within this 
case seven applicants accused the Russian army of the deaths of five relatives found 
killed in their house in February 2000. Having exhausted domestic remedies, Ruslan 
Estamirov and others submitted an application to the ECHR. Upon consideration of 
the case, the Court established that Russian authorities had violated art. 2 (right to life) 
and art. 13 (right to effective legal protection) of the ECPHRFF. Several villagers 
from Novy-Aldy were also submitted applications to the ECHR, which were 
recognized admissible. 
Applications by the relatives of the innocent civilians from Staropromyslovsky 
district arbitrarily executed during the “zachistka” in January 2000 were submitted to 
the ECHR (the case of “Magomed Hashiyev and Roza Akayeva versus Russia”). The 
corpses of the brother, sister and two nephews of the first applicant, as well as of the 
brother of the second applicant had been found with traces of gunshot wounds. In 
spite of the fact that Ingushetia courts established the facts of death of the applicants’ 
relatives in February 2000, the criminal case was not initiated until May 2000. During 
the proceedings, the investigation was repeatedly closed and renewed. 
On February 24, 2005, the Court passed a decision on the case. The RF was 
found guilty of the violation of art. 2 (right to life), art. 3 (torture ban) and art. 13 
(right to effective national protection) of the ECPHRFF. 
  
In the summer of 2000, large-scale battle actions were replaced with guerilla 
warfare; “zachistkas” started being used more often and, like before, were 
accompanied with cruelty, violence and robberies. 
Mass non-selective detentions of local residents became an important 
distinctive feature of many “zachistkas” throughout 2000-2003. The detained persons 
were taken to the “temporary filtration points” (“FPs”, for more details see 
chapter … ), where they were subjected to beatings and tortures. Such was the way 
used by the federal forces trying to obtain information on the people from the village 
supporting insurgents and hiding weapons. At the same time, they formed a network 
of secret informants.  
The robberies accompanying these “special actions” became of organized 
nature – property was sometimes openly taken out of the houses by military trucks.  
Local residents repeatedly submitted complaints to the organs of the 
Prosecutor’s Office, commandants, offices of the Ministry of Interior, the RF 
President, etc. Heads of administrations of numerous Chechen villages and towns also 
filed complaints regarding the actions by the employees of security agencies during 
“zachistka”. 
One cannot say that federal authorities did not respond to this kind of 
complaints. 
On May 24, 2001, Commander of the Coalition Task Force in the Northern 
Caucasus lieutenant-general V.Moltenskoy issued order No 145 aimed to restrict the 
scale of arbitrariness and violence during “zachistkas”. Under this order, heads of 
units and subdivisions of federal forces had to cooperate with the heads of local 
administrations, commandants, chiefs local police stations and military judges o the 
districts when holding special operations in towns and villages. At the beginning of 
the special operation, these officials had to be invited to the command center of the 
operation. 
In June-July, 2001, in the Kurchaloevsky district village of Sernovodsk and 
Sunzhensky district village of Assinovskaya “zachistkas” were accompanied with 
violence against civilians, robberies, beatings, murders and “disappearance” of people, 
while the provisions of order No 145 were completely ignored. 
These actions were broadly covered both in Russia and abroad. On July 25, 
2001, the RF Prosecutor General issued order No 46, which recognized the wrong-
doing in relation to human rights observance during special operations in its preamble 
to thetext. Farther on, the text of the order repeated the provisions of order No 145 
issued by general Moltenskoy and provided additional instructions. The instructions 
required precise registration of the detained persons fixing precisely who had detained 
these persons and when, as well as where they had been transferred to; to inform 
relatives in relation to the grounds for the detention and place the detained persons 
were held; to "promptly verify applications and complaints regarding cases of 
violence used against citizens, seizure or extortion of money”, etc. 
However, the “zachistkas” that followed after the issuance of order No 46 in 
the villages of Stary-Atagi, Alleroy, Novy-Atagi, Chiri-Yurt, Duba-Yurt, 
Alkhazurovo and others were nevertheless accompanied by robberies, property 
destruction, beatings of detained persons and “disappearances” of people. Even if 
public prosecutors were present during these “zachistkas”, local residents knew 
nothing about it. 
At last, in 2002, the employees of the Prosecutor’s Office really started 
attending the “zachistkas”. However, the presence of one or several prosecutors 
during these special operations with dozens and hundreds of security officers involved 
could not mend the situation dramatically. Those of the public prosecutors who tried 
to stop the crimes often encountered resistance of the military. 
The employees of the military and law enforcement bodies never introduced 
themselves when entering the houses during the special operations, their faces being 
masked. The armored personnel carriers that brought these employees either had no 
license plates or their plates were purposely mudded or painted. Therefore, it was 
difficult to identify after the “zachistka” who was responsible for the operation. 
The legal rights organizations tried to insist that the federal army commanders 
in Chechnya ensure, at least, the following elementary measures: 
•                     the body sides of all the armored vehicles should necessarily 
have license plates; 
•                     when holding special operations in towns and villages, the 
senior officer of each group of federal soldiers should introduce himself when 
entering a house or premise and produce his documents; 
•                     upon termination of the special operation, the official 
responsible for the operation should by all means provide to the head of the town or 
village administration a complete and exhaustive list of names of all the persons 
detained during the operation with indication of the reason for their detention and the 
place where these people will be delivered. 
Finally, on March 27, 2002, before the discussion of the issue related to 
Chechnya in the UN Commission for Human Rights, the Coalition Task Force general 
Moltenskoy issued order No 80 through which he obliged his subordinates to follow 
the aforementioned elementary norms of the law. However, this order was practically 
never executed. 
Here are just two examples: 
  
“Zachistka” in the village of Mesker-Yurt, Shalinsky district, was held from 
May 21 through June 11, 2002. Although military judge V.V. Tereshchuk was present 
in the village from the first day of the operation, the latter was accompanied by 
robberies. The security service employees blew up the village mayor’s office and beat 
the head of administration Mansur Aliyev when he tried to stand up for his fellow 
villagers. According to the prosecutor’s office, 208 local residents were delivered to 
the FP. Here, the detained persons were subjected to tortures. Thus, for example, 
soldiers cut the back of Barzayev Khussein with a knife and applied salt onto the 
wounds. Ibragim, one of the three brothers Khadjimuradovs, was tortured in the 
presence of two other brothers, who were later released after severe beatings and 
tortures. 
Eighteen persons from those arrested simply “disappeared”. Fragments of the 
other three blown up bodies were found by the locals near the FP. The Prosecutor’s 
Office admits that the “disappeared ones” were detained by the security officers: 
“During the special operation of 21.06, 2002, unrecognized persons took away to the 
FP Ortsuyev Islam Abdulayevich, born in 1980. The latter was taken away from his 
home at 157 Lenin str., village of Mesker-Yurt  in pretence of the need to check the 
documents and tracklessly disappeared.” Such are the statements used in relation to 
21 persons. Criminal cases on the facts of their “disappearance” had been initiated but 
the investigation was later on suspended due to the “impossibility to identify the 
persons to be charged of the crime”. 
  
On August 16, 2002, Russian armored troop carrier was mined and several 
soldiers wounded at the outskirts of the village of Tevzeni, Vvedensky district. The 
“zachistka” started soon after that. Breaking gates and fences armored troop carriers 
drove into courtyards. The jumping from them soldiers rushed into the houses where 
they beat people, broke and spoiled furniture, kitchenware and clothes, took away 
valuables.  Military vehicles crushed several dozens of trucks and cars belonging to 
the villagers. Soldiers detained young and old men including teenagers whom they 
picked randomly. They took away the school headmaster and two teachers from the 
teachers’ conference. The detained were taken to the outskirts of the village and told 
to lie down on the ground, face downwards. They were lying this way for many hours. 
The soldiers beat them with the gun-butts, kicked them and jumped on their backs. 
Then some of the people were released, but about seventy persons were taken away to 
the military unit headquarters, where they were held and interrogated for three days. 
The interrogated men were beaten and tortured with electric current so that they 
would give the names of those having mined the road. The soldiers attached wires to 
the earlobes and lower lip. The neighboring villages of Khatuni, Mahkety, 
Salmentauzen and Elistanzhi were also exposed to “zachistka”: . The military released 
the detained people only after the women from these villages held a protest action at 
the Government House in Groznyy that turned into mass disorders. 
  
At the beginning of November 2002, the RF President declared that no broad-
scale special operations should be any more held in the ChR towns and villages. After 
that, the number of large-scale “zachistkas” in Chechen towns and villages started 
gradually going down and decreased sharply after the summer of 2003. Nevertheless, 
large-scale special operations continued being held, although much rarer than before.  
For example, 27 special operations were held in 2005 in the towns and villages 
of the Urus-Martanovsky district only. 
Sometimes, special operations were held only by the ChR Ministry of Interior 
units, sometimes – jointly with the federal military forces; there were cases when 
“zachistkas” were performed by the federal forces independently. 
Order No 80 was practically never executed in full. 
Some of its provisions were observed only in some cases. However, when 
holding searches of the houses and courtyards, senior officers of militia or military 
groups practically never introduce or identify themselves. They usually do not present 
the lists of arrested persons to the heads of local governments. 
Unlike the period of 2000, the most outrageous violations of order No 80 have 
been taking place not during “zachistkas” but in the course of targeted local 
operations in the towns and villages starting with the first half of 2003 until nowadays. 
During the ChR presidential election campaign in July 2004, an attempt was 
made to reanimate order No 80. The ChR officials repeatedly insisted that the order is 
equally effective for the troops of the RF Мinistry of Defence, the RF Ministry of 
Interior and for the employees of the ChR Ministry of Interior. 
On July 16, the ChR Deputy Minister of Interior, militia colonel Akhmed 
Dakayev declared that “Provisions of order No 80 by the Commander of the Coalition 
Task Force in the Northern Caucasus are coming back into effect. Under this order, 
all the movements of armored vehicles and military groups about the Republic should 
be made under the control of commandants of towns and rural districts… The 
regulation of the special operations procedure is due to the having become more 
frequent cases of kidnappings in the Republic.” 
Alu Alkhanov, major candidate for presidency, declared that “the matter in 
question is not the prohibition against detention of criminals, but the need to do it 
legally, and, most importantly,  providing information as to who has detained this or 
that person and where this person is at the given moment”. However, later the ChR 
officials mainly concentrated on the observance of the instruction that during special 
operations the employees of the Ministry of Interior should not mask their faces.  
In 2004 – 2006, not only the number of “zachistkas” went down but also the 
scale of human rights violations during the special operations was usually much lower 
than before. 
Nevertheless, the level of cruelty during some of the “later zachistkas” could 
be compared with those of the worst times. 
  
On January 14, 2005, in the mountainous village of Zumsoy, Itum-Kalinsky 
district, federal paratroopers landed from helicopters. Before the landing, the village 
was exposed to uncontrollable machine gun firing from the air, although there were 
no insurgents in the village, nobody opened fire or offered any kind of resistance. 
After this, commandoes made “zachistka” in the village that was accompanied with 
robberies, property destruction and kidnappings. Soldiers rushed into houses, 
showered their inhabitants with rough abuse, broke and took away everything they 
found – money, jewelry, clothes, medicines, TV sets. From some of the houses, they 
took away all the documents they could find. In some farmsteads they shot horses and 
turkey cocks; blew up a car and a minibus belonging to Saidamin Khadzhiyev. In the 
villagers’ presence the pillage was loaded into the helicopters. In the evening of 
January 14, the soldiers kidnapped Shirvani Shakhidovich Nasipov, 1956. In the 
morning of January 15, Vakhu Makhmudovich Mukhayev, 1955, his 15-year-old son 
Atabi Vakhayevich  and 30 year-old Magomed-Emin Khabilovich Ibishev were taken 
away from their house. The same day, the soldiers left the village by helicopters 
taking away the kidnapped persons. The fate of the kidnapped remains unknown. The 
kidnapped persons’ relatives submitted applications to the ECHR that are now at the 
stage of communication. 
  
The events having taken place in the village of Borozdinovskaya, Shelkovskoy 
district of Chechnya were broadly covered in mass media. On June 4, 2005, the 
soldiers from the “Vostok” battalion consisting of ethnic Chechens and formally 
subordinated to the RF Ministry of Defense held a full-scale “zachistka”, which, in 
fact, was a  punitive action held in the village of Borozdinovskaya populated by 
Dargins that followed the murder of one battalion soldier’s father. Two armored troop 
carriers and not less than fifteen vehicles with armed soldiers drove into the village. 
They rushed into the houses taking men to the local school. In the schoolyard, the 
“detained persons” were told to lie down onto the ground, face downwards. 
Everybody, including old men, teenagers and invalids were kicked and beaten with 
gun-butts. The people were held on the ground for more than seven hours despite of 
the heavy rain. The “zachistka” resulted in four burnt houses, one elderly person burnt 
(maybe, alive), and 11 persons taken away and “disappeared”. 
The Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal case No 34/00/0013-05 on the facts 
of arsons, murders and kidnappings, a special joint investigatory group visited the 
scene of operation. However, the weapon was seized from soldiers of the “Vostok” 
battalion to carry out a ballistic examination only several months after the episode. 
One and a half year later the investigation is not yet completed, the fate of the 
kidnapped villagers of Borozdinskaya has not been established, nobody has been held 
criminally liable for kidnappings, murders and tortures. One officer of the battalion, 
Mukhadi Aziyev, was put on probation in October 2005 “for abuse of power” as he 
had permitted his soldiers enter the village. What these soldiers were doing in the 
village, who of them killed and set on fire the houses taking away the people has not 
been established in the course of investigation. 
Some time after these events, the commander of the “Vostok” battalion Sulim 
Yamadayev was awarded with the honorable Russian medal of “Hero of Russia”.  
  
  
7. Inhuman Treatment of Detained, Arrested and Kept in Custody Persons 
  
In this relation, both parties to the conflict violated and continue violating 
human rights and norms of the humanitarian law.  
Estimating the actions of the federal party in this respect, we should speak 
about the system of mass violence created in the Chechen Republic.  
  
7.1. Filtration System. 
  
From February 2000, mass media started reporting about the situation in the 
“filtration points” (FPs) created by the federal forces in the Chechnya territory. 
According to the people released therefrom, the detained persons were held in the FPs 
in intolerable conditions being exposed to tortures and cruel treatment. Most often, 
such information used to come from the Chernokozovo FP in Naursky district of 
Chechnya. This former maximum-security penitentiary facility was turned into the 
largest of the effective filtration camps. However, Chernokozovo is not the only 
facility of this kind but just one of the elements in the whole system. 
The key task of the “filtration system” was to identify and isolate participants 
of armed formations resisting federal forces and their supporters. However, it is 
obvious that the same system was aimed to resolve broader issues – it was used for 
creation of the network of informers recruited from among the local population and, 
along with other actions by the federal forces, for terror, suppression and intimidation 
of all the people disloyal to the regime in Chechnya. 
The major characteristic of the “filtration system” was its non-selectivity. 
Lack of systematized data on the participants of armed formations resulted in mass 
detentions of innocent people, while their confession of the crime could be the only 
accusatory evidence against them. Obtainment of the confession was possible only 
through intimidation, beatings and tortures.  
  
The word-combination “filtration point” (FP) appeared during the first 
Chechen war of 1994-1996 as the official name of the places for holding the detained 
persons in the ChR territory, although their legal status was not certain and creation – 
illegal. 
In contrast to this, during the second Chechen war (the so-called “CTO”) some 
of the “filtration system” facilities got legitimate statuses of investigative isolators 
(SIZO) subordinated to the RF Ministry of Justice and temporary detention isolators 
(IVS) subordinated to the RF Ministry of Interior. 
The Chernokozovo FP was created at the end of 1999 and, at the beginning, it 
had the status of “temporary reception center for the persons detained on the grounds 
of vagrancy and begging”. The status of “reception center” was convenient for the 
Ministry of Interior as such facilities, unlike the SIZO, are fully subordinated to 
militia, while the people delivered there without any charges can be held for much 
longer periods than in the IVS. The people delivered to the Chernokozovo “reception 
center” were anyone but vagabonds; those were all kinds of “suspicious persons” 
including the persons detained during “zachistka” in their own homes. In the winter of 
2000, journalist Andrey Babitsky was delivered there and became a witness of the 
atrocities taking place there. 
  
FPs were created during 2000-2002 at the outskirts of the towns and villages 
in the course of numerous “zachistkas”, where the employees of the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Interior and internal security structures delivered the detained 
persons. There, they “checked” tens and even hundreds of local residents as to their 
belonging to the illegal armed formations. Based on the results of this check, the 
detained persons had to be either released or transferred to other penitentiary facilities. 
The group of soldiers performing the “zachistka” usually set up a camp at the 
outskirts of the town or village, while the FP was located nearby, in the open field or 
in the abandoned premises. As one of the basic characteristics of “zachistkas” in the 
period of 2000 – 2003 was mass nature and non-selectivity of detentions, the number 
of detained people exceeded the capacity of the “regular” detention places and 
majority of these people were soon released, as a rule. Nevertheless, practically all 
those held in the FPs were exposed to beatings and tortures, while some of them 
“disappeared” during numerous special operations. Tortures with electric current 
using field phone wire were widely spread. 
The legal status of such FPs within effective Russian legislation is absolutely 
unclear. The current normative acts regulating the activity of detention facilities, 
places where the persons are held in custody or other forms of forcible restriction of 
citizens’ physical freedom contain no such concept as “FP”. 
Besides temporary FPs, there also existed regular, long-term facilities, one of 
them named by the military “Titanic”, which was located between the villages of 
Alleroy and Tsentoroy, wherefrom people used to “disappear” as well. Thus, the 
cousins of Alsultanovs – Magomed-Emin Soipovich and Khan-Ali-Imaliyevich 
detained by the federal forces in the village of Alleroy on August 17, 2001, during 
“zachistka” were delivered to "Titanic".  The ChR prosecutor V.Chernov saw them 
there during the inspection visit. Later on, the Alsultanovs “disappeared”. The 
relatives of the detained persons applied to different official structures, the ChR 
Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal case. It was established that “the 
brothers Alsultanovs had been transferred to the filtration point under the 
responsibility of the employee from the Federal Security Service Office  for the 
Chechen Republic S. Baryshev who, in his turn, transferred the detained persons to 
the military officers so that they would take them to the IVS in Kurchaloyevsky 
Department of the Ministry of Interior. However, the brothers Alsultanovs have not 
been transferred to the IVS of the Kurchaloyevsky Department of the Ministry of 
Interior and their whereabouts at present are unknown; the investigation of the case 
on the Alsultanovs’ disappearance is undertaken by the ChR military procuracy”. The 
fate of the disappeared persons has not been yet established. 
  
Some people from the temporary and regular FPs were released, while those 
whom the military found necessary “to continue working with” were either 
transferred to the official detention facilities, i.e. IVSs created within the district 
Temporary  Departments of the Ministry of Interior (VOVD), and SIZO or to illegal 
prisons. However, as it was already mentioned before, some of the people died in the 
FPs. 
Besides, from the very beginning of the holding of “CTO” in Chechnya illegal 
prisons started being created at the places of deployment of military units or special 
units of the Ministry of Interior. The prisoners kept there were not officially registered 
anywhere neither as the detained, nor as the arrested. The most widely known place 
like this was located at the military base in the village of Khankala. The majority of 
the people kept there were held in the holes dug in the ground or in the trucks and 
railway cars intended for the transportation of prisoners. Russia’s central TV channels 
repeatedly broadcasted programs showing how the persons detained on suspicion of 
participation in the illegal armed formations were delivered to Khankala, although 
under the norms of the Russian legislation the persons suspected of having committed 
crimes of terrorist nature or of participation in the illegal armed formations should be 
transferred to the organs of the Prosecutor’s Office or FSB rather than delivered to the 
place where the military unit is deployed. 
Employees of the Prosecutor’s Office and of the Chechen Civil Administration, 
as well as of the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the RF for 
ensuring human and civil rights and freedoms in the Republic of Chechnya knew 
about the continued functioning of illegal prisons in Khankala.   
The situation in such "filtration facilities" could change both for the better and 
for the worse. 
In the late winter of 2000, after the publicizing of evidence related to tortures 
and beatings of the people kept in Chernokozovo “reception center” and protests by 
the international public, the Russian authorities quickly changed the status of this FP 
turning it into SIZO. After that, life conditions there improved notably although the 
use of tortures continued. During the period of 2000 – 2002, the temporary isolator 
functioning within the Ministry of Interior Departments in Urus-Martan and 
Oktabrsky district of the city of Groznyy became especially ill-famed. The detained 
and arrested persons there were regularly exposed to torture; some of these people 
“disappeared”. 
Later, when Russian and foreign public focused its attention on the events 
taking place in the temporary isolators, violence, cruelty, tortures and arbitrary 
executions were transferred to the informal detention places (for example, in 
Khankala) or to the quasi-legal places of close custody. 
  
The exact number of the people having passed through the filtration system is 
impossible to be identified – those are thousands of citizens. 
When asked about the number of detentions and arrests, the official structures 
usually give as statistics to the press and public the number of persons having gone 
through the SIZO in Chernokozovo and now in Groznyy – these are about ten 
thousand. 
However, the real number of the persons detained and arrested in Chechnya is 
many times as high. According to the communiqués, during the first years of the 
“CTO”, the units of the Chechen Ministry of Interior used to detain 1.1-1.2 thousand 
persons a month. If we add here the number of people detained by other security 
agencies, the overall number of the persons officially detained during the “CTO”, 
even by minimal estimations, made about 20 thousand a year.  
However, during each “zachistka” the majority of the people having been 
delivered to the temporary FPs were not registered. Only some of those who, for some 
reason, interested the “competent bodies” during the “filtration” became officially 
registered as detained persons. 
Here should be also added the people held in the territory of military units’ 
deployment.  
Thus, by the most modest estimations, the overall number of those having 
passed through the “filtration system” reaches 200 thousand. For Chechnya, with its 
population at present being less than one million, it is an enormous number illustrative 
of the state terror scale. 
  
  
7.2. Illegal Prisons Today 
  
From the end of 2003, the number of mass “zachistkas” in Chechnya 
essentially reduced and practically no new FPs were created respectively. During the 
last few years, the detained and kidnapped persons are by far rarer delivered to the 
military base in Khankala. However, new illegal detention places are being created to 
replace the old habitual ones. The hostages are held in illegal prisons in the places of 
deployment of the Chechen pro-federal security structures.  
One of places where the detained and kidnapped persons are illegally held is 
located in the village of Tsentoroy where the Chechnya Prime Minister Ramzan 
Kadyrov and his family are living. At present, this place is as notoriously famed in 
Chechnya, as was the military base of Khankala two years ago. It was here that on 
May 1, 2006, the delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Tortures and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was disallowed. 
According to the information of the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial”, the Center of 
“Demos” and the International Helsinki Federation, all the people held in the illegal 
prison had been relocated therefrom one day before, many of them had been released. 
On May 2, the European delegation could drive in Tsentoroy without any obstacles. 
Apparently, it was here that the relatives of the President of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria A.Mashadov had been held for half a year. They were forcibly 
taken away from their homes in unknown direction on December 3 and 28, 2004. 
Both the circumstances of this kidnapping and the evidence of the witnesses specified 
that the kidnappers were the “Kadyrovists”. With significant delay and after 
scandalous publicity, the Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal case on the 
fact of kidnapping. However, for more than six months there was no news regarding 
the fate of the kidnapped persons. On May 31, 2005, almost three months after 
Maskhadov's death, all the kidnapped relatives were released. According to the 
released persons, all this time they had been held all together in the concrete cell 
without any furniture, its floor space being three by three meters. Under the ceiling, 
there was a small grilled window. They had not been accused of anything or 
interrogated being allowed to leave the cell only to go to the bathroom. The 
kidnapped people noticed that the place where they had been held was located on 
rather big fenced territory. There were many armed people speaking mainly Chechen. 
On May 30, there came a person in civilian clothing to their cell and announced that 
they were free. The same day, for the first time in the course of five months, they 
were allowed to take a bath. Next morning, the kidnapped, with their eyes blindfolded, 
were taken home. On July 27, 2005, the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian 
Federation N.I. Shepel declared, that “Maskhadov's relatives were set free as a result 
of a special operation”. At the same time, he said that “the kidnappers had not been 
identified”. The investigation of the criminal case on the fact of kidnapping of seven 
relatives of Maskhadov was suspended due to “the impossibility to identify the 
persons to be held liable as accused of the kidnapping”.  
  
There is a lot of evidence by the people saying that they themselves or their 
relatives were held in the illegal prison in Tsentsaroy and that the people there are 
exposed to tortures and beatings. 
Illegal prisons exist in other places as well. Usually, these are the places where 
the of security structures units are deployed. At present, these are most often the 
structures referred to the so-called “Kadyrovists”.  
The quasi-legal detention place in the city of Groznyy, the so-called temporary 
isolator within the Bureau No 2 for Operative Investigation (ORB-2) should be noted 
separately. This is the detention facility for the suspects and persons on remand whose 
employees are holding operative work, inquest and investigation, although under the 
Russian legislation norms the temporary isolators can exist only within militia’s 
operating authority. In fact, this temporary isolator has become a specialized place 
where the persons on remand are transferred from SIZO to obtain by force the 
evidence needed by the investigators.  
  
  
  
7.3. Torture 
  
Methods of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and torture are practiced 
everywhere in the ChR both when detaining suspects and when holding them in 
detention facilities, as well as during interrogations. Not only the detained but also 
their relatives, friends and even mere strangers who simply happen to be near them 
become objects for cruel treatment during apprehensions and arrests. Constant 
“disappearances” of the people detained by the employees of different security 
agencies, torture of the people who “disappear” in this manner, as well as the deeply 
rooted in the Republic and directly connected with these most serious violations of 
human rights corruption create a specific atmosphere of impunity and lawlessness on 
all the levels of society and authority.  As a result, Chechnya is in the shroud of terror 
and fear. 
  
  
8. "Disappearances" of People. Arbitrary Executions 
  
People in Chechnya “disappeared” and continue “disappearing”. In most cases, 
they are kidnapped not by gangsters or terrorists but by those who perform “CTO”. 
From the first days of the military operation in Chechnya, the relatives of the 
persons detained by soldiers or employees of the Ministry of Interior or of the RF 
FSB [Federal Security Service] for a long time could find out nothing as to the reason 
for the detention, the place where they were held or whether had been charged, etc. 
The same practice is nowadays used by different pro-Moscow Chechen formations 
created in the process of conflict “chechenization”. 
On the website of the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial”, one can find 
information about approximately 1250 civilians missing after detention by the 
employees of the federal security structures during “the second Chechen war”, i.e. 
since autumn of 1999. This overall number includes the corpses of more than 100 
persons having been found and identified, while the rest continue being registered as 
"missing".  
The Legal Rights Center of "Memorial" has data on about 1650 cases in 
relation to the people having “disappeared” throughout the whole period of “the 
second Chechen war”. The “Memorial" has entered into correspondence with the 
organs of the Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the majority of these cases. Criminal 
cases have been initiated; however, according to the available data, in the majority of 
cases the proceedings have been suspended “due to the non-identification of the 
persons liable to be accused”. 
Only for the period of 2002 through September 2006, i.e. the period when the 
federal forces switched from large-scale “zachistkas” to the “targeted operations” and 
to the conflict “chechenization” the Legal Center of “Memorial” has collected 
information on 1976 kidnapped ChR citizens (see the table). There are more or less 
detailed data on all to these facts including the last, first and middle names of the 
kidnapped persons, permanent address, kidnapping circumstances, etc. It should be 
noted that these data are obviously incomplete and to obtain general picture these 
figures should be, probably, multiplied by two-four times. 
Based on the extrapolation of these data and analysis of the communiqués, the 
Center of “Memorial” insists that throughout the whole period of the holding of 
“CTO”, the number of the persons “having disappeared” through kidnapping, illegal 
detentions, and apprehensions is, for sure, within three to five thousand. 
Unfortunately, it is meanwhile impossible to get a more exact figure. 
At the same time, we can state the decreasing dynamics in the number of 
kidnappings fixed by the Center of “Memorial”: 539 – in 2002; 497 – in 2003; 448 – 
in 2004; 320 – in 2005 and 172 – in 2006. 
  
Kidnappings in the ChR territory according to the data of the Legal Rights 
Center of "Memorial" 
  
Year Kidnapped Including 
those 
released or 
ransomed 
Including 
those  
found 
killed 
Including 
those who 
disappeared 
Including 
those under 
examination  
2002 539 90 81 368   
2003 497 157 52 288   
2004 448 213 24 203 8 
2005 320 154 24 127 15 
2006  172 86 9 60 17 
Total: 1976 700 190 1046 40 
  
Decrease in the number of kidnappings fixed by human rights advocates is due, 
to a great extent, to the “chechenization” of the military conflict and “latent violence” 
prevailing in the ChR, which is not fixed either by human rights advocates or, 
particularly, by law enforcement bodies. One cannot state for sure how much the total 
number of kidnappings has changed. However, one thing is clear – the methods of 
carrying out the “CTO” have definitely changed: The majority of kidnappings are 
undertaken by the local security agencies that do not necessarily need to kill people in 
order to achieve their goals. Quite often, the kidnapped persons spend some time, 
from one to several days, in illegal detention facilities, where they are beaten and 
tortured in order to force data. On the other hand, relatives of the kidnapped persons 
independently undertake efforts, oftentimes through ransom, in order to have their 
kidnapped relatives released. After the ransom of the kidnapped person, usually 
neither this person nor the family complain anywhere or provide information in 
relation to kidnapping, being afraid of retribution of the kidnappers who, unlike 
federal soldiers, are well informed about kinship and weak points of their victims. 
During the last few years, the share of the “disappeared” or killed from the 
overall number of those kidnapped has decreased. Throughout the period of 2001-
2002, their number made about 85% of those kidnapped during mass-scale 
“zachistkas”. It is obvious that the major responsibility for these crimes is with the 
soldiers, militiamen and employees of special security agencies. Throughout the 
process of “chichenization” one could note gradual decrease in the percentage of 
those “disappeared” or killed versus the overall number of the kidnapped making 
about 50% in 2004-2005 and about 40% at present. 
During the last few years there were registered cases when the kidnapped 
“were found” after a while in SIZO or temporary isolators. They are accused of the 
crimes related to “terrorism” as provided in art. 205), of the RF Criminal Code, of 
“participation in illegal armed formations” (art. 208) and of “illegal keeping of 
weapon” (art. 222). This is probably the way the employees of security agencies try to 
fulfill the plan on capturing insurgents and disclosing crimes. 
People are kidnapped not only in the ChR territory, but also in the territories of 
adjoining regions. 
As opposed to Chechnya, in the neighboring Republic of Ingushetia the 
number of kidnappings has considerably grown versus 2002 (2002 – 28 kidnappings, 
2003 – 52, 2004 – 48, 2005 - 47). At the same time, the circumstances of these crimes 
make it possible to draw a conclusion regarding participation in them of the 
representatives of governmental bodies. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
traces of the kidnappers and the kidnapped led to Chechnya. 
  
The events having taken place in the village of Novy-Atagi, Shalinsky district, 
can serve as a typical example of kidnapping by the security forces in Chechnya. On 
the night of  September 13, and the night of September 14, the employees of security 
structures kidnapped local residents, and namely: Ruslan Salaudinovich Khalayev, 
born in 1984, Sharaudin Badrudinovich Khalayev, 1978, Magomed Isayevich 
Elikhanov, 1985, Apti Edilov, 18 years old; Magomed-Zmi Aguyev, born in 1987, 
and Islam Khusainovich Bakalov, 1987. According to the relatives of the kidnapped 
persons, when detaining them, the security officers behaved roughly, did not 
introduce themselves and did not explain the reason for taking away the people. Local 
residents picketed the highway going via the village and demanded release of the 
kidnapped. The district Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal case under art. 127 
(illegal deprivation of freedom) of the RF Criminal Code. On the night of September 
18, the employees of an unknown security agency kidnapped the head of the village 
administration Abdulla Datsayev. He was taken away to the district center in Shali 
and released at daybreak, severely beaten. Datsayev invited the parents of Elikhanov 
and insistently asked them not to picket the road. The next few days, the majority of 
the kidnapped villagers were released after fiendish tortures, while four of them - 
Elikhanov, Aguyev and the Khalayevs were transferred by the kidnappers to the 
Shalinsky District Department of the Ministry of Interior. The fact of illegal 
depravation of freedom was obvious, but militia did not take any measures against the 
kidnappers. Moreover, in the District Department of the Ministry of Interior the 
officers officially registered the fact of arrest of the "transferred" people as the latter, 
under tortures, had already confessed their crimes. Several days later, a big group of 
armed people came to the mosque in the village of Novy-Atagi during the Friday 
prayer. Aslambek Yasayev, PPSM-2 regiment commander, who headed the group, 
declared to the crowd of villagers that he and his employees would continue holding 
similar operations and threatened with punishment to those picketing the road as 
response to the detention of their fellow-villagers. The criminal case on illegal 
deprivation of freedom “has been under investigation” for more than one year, but 
nobody has been held liable. 
  
It should be noted that besides kidnappings that are carried out by 
“Kadyrovists”, “Yamadayevists” and other security structures of the Republic, there 
still take place the facts of kidnappings by federal security officers. 
  
Throughout the period of holding of “CTO”, local residents repeatedly found 
secret burial dumps of the people kidnapped earlier by the state security structures. 
Here is just one example. 
In February 2001, in the ruins of the garden suburb of “Zdorovye”, in the 
immediate proximity from the main Russian military base of Khankala, there was 
found a dump of corpses (it cannot be defined otherwise). On February 24, Public 
Prosecutor’s Office began investigation. According to the official data, there were 
found corpses of 51 persons (according to the informal sources there were even more 
of them but they remained there, in the dump).  
All people, whose corpses were found in the garden suburb of "Zdorovye" 
became victims of extra-judicial executions: The majority of them had their throats 
cut, hands tied, control shots made in the heads. 
24 corpses were identified by the relatives. All of them had been earlier 
detained by the representatives of federal forces on the block-posts during 
“zachistkas” and so on. 
Among those killed, for example, there was found the body of Nara Luluyeva 
and her two cousin sisters. According to the relatives, they had been detained on June 
3, 2000 at the market in Groznyy by the Russian soldiers who had taken them away in 
the armored troop carrier and then “disappeared”.  
The complaint of Nura Luluyeva’s relatives (“Luluyev and others versus 
Russia”) was allowed in the ECHR on November 9, 2006. Under the decision of the 
Court, the Russian Federation was recognized guilty of violation of the right to life 
and inefficient investigation of the murder of Nura Luluyeva (art. 2 ECPHRF. Here 
and below can be found the articles of the Convention), inhuman treatment (art. 3), 
violation of the right to freedom and inviolability of the person (art. 5) and the right to 
effective legal protection (art. 13). 
In the burial dumping at the military base of Khankala, there were corpses of 
the people who had been detained at different periods of times and in different places 
of the ChR, which proves a regular and organized nature of the actions undertaken by 
the murderers and kidnappers. We can positively insist that there were and are “death 
squads” in the ChR – criminal communities existing inside the state security agencies 
that are protected in their operation by the highest rank military, militia and political 
officials.  
  
The ECHR has examined another two complaints with regard to the 
“disappearances” of the persons detained by the Russian state representatives. In both 
of these cases, Russia was found guilty of human rights violations. 
The decision on the case of “Bazorkin versus Russia” was passed on July 27, 
2006. The Court examined the situation with the “disappearance” of Khadji-Murat 
Yandiyev, 25, resident of the Chechen Republic, detained on February 1, 2000, after 
he had left Groznyy together with the group of insurgents. After his detention in the 
village of Alkhan-Kala, Yandiyev was interrogated by general-colonel Aleksandr 
Baranov who later ordered to “liquidate” Yandiyev. The CNN correspondent filmed 
the interrogation and the order on the execution; this record was presented to the 
Court as evidence. From the moment of Yandiyev’s interrogation, the latter was 
registered missing. Despite of numerous attempts by his mother Fatima Bazorkina to 
find her son and to apply to the Russian law-enforcement structures, the criminal case 
on the fact of “disappearance” was initiated only in July 2001, almost eighteen 
months after the events. The video record that the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” 
transferred to the organs of the Prosecutor’s Office “disappeared” when being sent to 
the military procuracy in Khankala. Despite of the clear evidence, the case 
investigation was suspended six times throughout six years with the explanation that it 
was “impossible to identify the suspects”. General-colonel Baranov was first time 
interrogated in June 2004. Russia’s court brought no charges against him. In its 
decision, the Court established the following: Yandiyev’s detention was unlawful 
(art.5); Russia’s authorities are responsible for Yandiyev’s death (art.2); investigation 
of the fact of Yandiyev’s “disappearance” was inadequate (art.2); Yandiyev’s 
mother’s sufferings due to her son’s “disappearance” and Russia’s authorities failure 
to take adequate measures in order to establish his fate testify to the exceeding of the 
minimum threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment (art.3). The Court specified 
the violation of art.13 providing for the access to the means of legal defense. 
The case of “Imakayeva versus Russia” is no less indicative. On December 17, 
2000, Said-Khuseyn Imakayev “disappeared” from the block-post between the 
villages of Stary and Novy-Atagi. Some witnesses had seen soldiers making him get 
into the military vehicle, which immediately drove away. The parents’ searches and 
their application to the official instances regarding the “disappearance” of their son 
yielded no results. At the beginning of 2002, they submitted an application  to the 
Strasbourg Court, after which Said-Magomed, father of S.-Kh. Imakayev was taken 
away by the Russian soldiers on the armored troop carrier in unknown direction and 
also “disappeared” without any traces. In its decision on Imakayev’s case, the Court 
made a number of most important conclusions: Said-Khuseyn Imakayev and Said-
Magomed Imakayev had been unlawfully detained by the Russian security structures 
(art. 5 of the ECPHRFF); Said-Khuseyn and Said-Magomed Imakayevs should be 
considered dead and Russian authorities bear responsibility for their deaths (art. 2); 
investigation of the unlawful detention and “disappearance” is inadequate due to a 
whole number of reasons (the Court specifically noted lack of attempts by the 
investigation to establish what armored troop-carriers and military subdivisions 
participated in the detentions); the “disappearance” of the Imakayevs and lack of 
adequate measures that should have been undertaken by the Russian government to 
establish their afterlife is an example of inhuman treatment (art. 3); the lack of 
sanctions and guarantees in the process of search is a violation of the right to respect 
for private and family life, home and correspondence, while the reference by the 
authorities to the special powers stipulated by the Law on Struggle against Terrorism 
appears to be insufficient (art. 8). The decision specifies that the Court was amazed 
with the irresponsibility or failure to assume direct responsibility by the officials who 
participated in events. The Court also criticized the Russian authorities for the failure 
to cooperate with it, and namely, for the failure to provide requested documents (art. 
38).  
  
  
9. Taking Insurgents’ Relatives Hostage, Repressive Acts against Insurgents’ 
Relatives  
  
Such methods of carrying out the “CTO” were used from the end of 2001. 
However, this practice became of systematic nature with the further development of 
the conflict “chechenization”. In 2004, with participation, support and cover up of the 
federal center, the earlier practiced sporadic cases of hostage taking, arsons and 
demolition of houses, murders and other forms of repressive actions in relation to the 
family members of suspected insurgents became systematic. If in former times, 
repressive actions in relation to the combatants’ families were either revenge or an 
attempt to obtain from the relatives information about the insurgents offering 
resistance; now these methods have become tactics to render pressure upon insurgents 
with the purpose to force them to surrender. The kidnappings described earlier, as 
well as keeping in illegal prisons of the relatives of Aslan Maskhadov is an element of 
this widespread practice and such examples are numerous.  
Prosecutions of insurgents’ relatives go beyond hostage taking practice. One 
of the most known recent cases of this kind is kidnapping and “disappearance” of 
Elina Ersenoyeva. On August 17, 2006, in the center of Groznyy, the employees of 
unestablished security structures kidnapped a 26-year-old Elina Ersenoyeva, 
employee of the non-profit-making organization of “Info-Bridge” and string 
correspondent of the newspaper Chechenskoye obshchestvo. About 9 o'clock in the 
morning, she was at the Pobeda boulevard together with her aunt Rovzan. Some 
unfamiliar persons in masks and camouflage approached the women. They 
frogmarched the women into different vehicles, put sacks onto their heads and took 
them away in unknown direction. After a while, they were taken off the vehicles and, 
with the sacks still on their heads, pushed into some cellar. Rovzan was soon again 
put into the vehicle, brought back to Groznyy and left in the middle of the street. That 
day Elina Ersenoyeva called her relatives twice by the cell phone and asked to not 
raise panic hoping that she would soon be released. However, Elina never came back 
home, while her phone stopped responding.  
Two days before the kidnapping, Elina applied to the International Helsinki 
Federation and the Center of “Demos” with a request for help. She wrote that local 
security structures (“Kadyrovists”, as she specified) had been persecuting her and her 
family for some time and explained that this pressure was due to the fact that in 
November 2005 she had married a man who appeared to be an insurgent and who was 
killed in the summer of 2006. On August 23, it became known that Ersenoyeva was 
wife of Shamil Basayev ( the sources close to Elina say that the marriage was not 
voluntary). At the end of August 2006, the ChR Prosecutor’s Office initiated a 
criminal case on the fact of Ersenoyeva’s kidnapping. Elina’s whereabouts and fate 
have not yet been established. According to informal sources, in the middle of 
October 2006 she was still alive and was held in one of the “secret” prisons. 
Elina Ersenoyeva’s mother, Rita (Margarita) Ersenoyeva (born in 1958) took 
active efforts to find her daughter. Hoping that publicity would help to have her 
daughter released, Rita willingly met with Russian and western journalists and 
representatives of legal rights organizations. On October 2, 2006, Rita Ersenoyeva 
“disappeared” and there are strong reasons to suspect that she had been kidnapped. 
That day Rita came to see her mother Lipa Barzukayeva, 65, living in the village of 
Stary-Atagi, Mayskaya Street. There she got a mobile phone call. She said to her 
mother that it was the call from the “investigator” who had said that if she wanted “to 
learn good news” about her daughter Elina, she should immediately come to the 
village administration. 10 minutes later, Rita’s mother called her mobile phone but it 
was disconnected. After several attempts to contact her daughter, Barzukayeva asked 
a relative to go to the village administration where the latter was told that Rita did not 
come and nobody had invited her there. Since then, the family has no news from Rita 
Ersenoyeva and no information as to her whereabouts. Being afraid for their safety, 
the relatives did not inform the law enforcement bodies about this. When meeting in 
September with the representatives of the International Helsinki Federation and the 
Center of “Demos”, Rita Ersenoyeva mentioned some Suleyman Bakriyev, employee 
of the Groznyy District Department of the Ministry of Interior who threatened that 
“she would smart” for her talks with journalists and foreigners. Pressure was, in 
particular, due to the fact that in September Rita was questioned in connection with 
her daughter’s kidnapping by the members of the European Commission for 
Prevention of Tortures  that visited Chechnya. 
  
  
10. Impunity of Perpetrators 
  
In all the ECHR decisions in relation to the complaints of the ChR citizens, it 
is specified that no effective investigation was undertaken on the national level in 
relation to the applicants’ complaints. 
The situation with investigation of crimes against civilian population in the 
conflict zone can be called “selective impunity”. The crimes committed by insurgents 
are investigated with severe sentences passed upon the accused, whereas regarding the 
crimes committed by the state representatives everything is much more complicated.  
In the majority of the crimes against innocent civilians known to the Legal 
Rights Center of “Memorial”, the organs of the Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated 
criminal cases although, quite often, such criminal cases were closed despite of the 
fact that all the constituent elements of the crime were evident. 
From the end of 1999, the overall number of criminal cases initiated against 
the security structures representatives who had supposedly (based on the available 
facts) committed crimes against civilians was over two thousand. However, only a 
minor part of these cases were transferred to the military procuracy, while the 
investigation of their absolute majority has been suspended in the territorial Office of 
the ChR Public Prosecutor “due to the non-identification of the persons  to be held 
liable as the accused.”  
The official statistics is inconsistent and obviously falsified. In February 2003, 
the RF Deputy Prosecutor General S.N. Fridinsky reported that “throughout the 
period of the holding of CTO, the organs of the ChR Prosecutor’s Office had 
investigated 417 criminal cases on the crimes supposedly committed against local 
population by the representatives of federal forces”. This number included 341 cases 
(82%), the investigation of which had been suspended by that moment “due to the 
non-identification of the persons to be held liable…”. In August 2004, the same 
Fredinsky answered the identically formulated question, “Throughout the whole 
period of the holding of the CTO in the ChR territory, the organs of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office had initiated 132 criminal cases based on the facts of crimes 
committed against local population by the representatives of federal forces,” 
including ten criminal cases the investigation of which had been suspended. Finally, 
in May 2005, the RF Deputy Prosecutor General N.I. Shepel said that “throughout the 
whole period of the holding of the CTO in the ChR territory, there have been initiated 
by the organs of ChR  Prosecutor's Office 143 criminal cases that were committed, 
according to  the available information by representatives of federal forces”.  
Proceeding from the data collected by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial”, 
we can state that all the mentioned figures are many times lower and have little to do 
with reality. However, the ease with which Prosecutor’s Office manipulates with 
these figures is worthy of attention. 
The response by Shepel quoted earlier mentioned that throughout the period of 
2000 – April of 2005, “the organs of the ChR Prosecutor’s Office initiated 2197 
criminal cases on the facts of crimes committed by the members of illegal armed 
formation against civilians, local authorities and administrations, as well as 
representatives of federal forces”. 
Lately, when responding to the inquiries in relation to kidnappings made by 
the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial”, the organs of the Prosecutor’s Office more 
and more often say that “the facts were not proven”. This is the usual way for things 
to happen, if the relatives manage to ransom the person kidnapped by the security 
structures representatives. Neither the victim of kidnapping, nor its relatives complain 
to the Prosecutor’s Office or, if the application has already been submitted, they take 
it back.  
However, even in case of initiated criminal cases, no specific military officials 
or representatives of other security agencies are held criminally liable, while the cases, 
as it has been specified above, are discontinued. For example, investigation of not less 
than three forth (¾) of all criminal cases initiated in relation to the crimes that became 
known to the Center of “Memorial” have already been suspended. 
The cases regarding the “disappearances” of apprehended or arrested persons 
remain practically always uninvestigated. 
We have some data in relation to the total number of federal forces’ 
representatives having been convicted on the charges of crimes against civilians in 
Chechnya as of the middle of 2005. Throughout the whole period of “the second 
Chechen war” verdicts have been passed upon 103 military men. Eight of them were 
found innocent. Thus, for example, four military men from the special troops of the 
Main Intelligence Service (captain Ulman and others) who admited having detained 
civilians were justified. The court has closed the criminal case regarding three 
military men due to the decriminalization of the performed act. In relation to other 
twenty military men, the courts have applied amnesty. The amnestied, for example, 
included one contract soldier who opened fire from hooligan motives killing one 
woman and wounding another. 
Only 27 military men, the majority of them having killed innocent civilians 
during their off-hours have been convicted by courts to different terms of 
imprisonment (from one year of labor settlement to eighteen years of maximum-
security imprisonment). 
The absolute majority of the convicted got “symbolic” punishments: 
conditional sentences (including for rapes, robberies, extortion, torture of the illegally 
detained persons, thefts, deliberate destruction of property, etc.), fines (for beating, 
unlawful apprehension of Prosecutor’s Office representatives, etc.), restrictions on the 
army service. 
By the middle of 2005, 34 militiamen were convicted for the crimes against 
civilians. Due to their being military men, their conviction is of a “symbolic” nature. 
Only 7 militiamen were convicted to real terms of imprisonment. The others received 
conditional imprisonment (including for shooting in the state of intoxication with 
civilians killed or wounded, for extortion, taking bribes, threats to kill, hooliganism, 
etc.). 
Not a single of the known episodes of mass killings of civilian persons by the 
federal forces in Staropromyslovsky district of Groznyy, Alkhan-Yurt and Novye 
Aldy has been fully investigated.  
None of the criminal cases on the facts of revealed mass graves has been 
investigated.  
Paragraph 94 of the RF Fourth Periodic Report on the implementation of the 
Convention against Tortures presented for consideration at the session of the UN 
Committee against Tortures in November 2006, provides data on the number of 
investigated and submitted to the courts criminal cases related to kidnappings. It is 
reported that, “51 criminal case on 78 episodes have been taken to court throughout 
the period of holding of the CTO, 84 persons have been convicted”. These figures are 
insignificant even against the background of the official and very much understated 
statistics of “disappearances”. Secondly, only two representatives of the federal 
security structures have been convicted for kidnapping throughout the whole period of 
the second Chechen war: colonel Yuri Budanov and militiaman from Hunty-Mansiysk 
Autonomous Okrug Sergey Lapin. At the same time, art. 126 of the RF Criminal 
Code (“kidnapping”) was referred to in the verdict to Budanov having kidnapped and 
cruelly killed Chechen girl Elza Kungayeva in March 2000. Lapin’s verdict contains 
no reference to art. 126, although he was actually convicted for kidnapping in January 
2001. Zelimkhan Murdalov was tortured in the Oktyabrsky VOVD and then 
“disappeared”. There are no other cases related to kidnapping with any names of 
security structures’ employees mentioned. On the other hand, the figures provided in 
the report refer to the cases with the accused being the participants of armed 
formations offering resistance to federal forces and criminal elements. 
Impunity is no less obvious in the cases of investigations related to tortures 
and excess of power. Even in the rare cases when the victim of tortures is ready to 
openly give evidence and the tortures’ names are known, the investigation may be 
suspended, for example, due to “the impossibility to establish the location of the 
suspect", although in most cases they do not even try to abscond.  
The Hasavyurt Agreement of August 1996 and Moscow Agreement of May 1997 
Official leaders of the ChR represented by Mashadov censured this invasion 
The biggest pro-federalist security structure consisting of ethnic Chechens is 
subordinated to R. Kadyrov. It consists of numerous units scattered all over Chechnya 
and united at a certain point of time into the so-called Security Service. (“Security 
Service” in Chechnya no longer officially exists. However, its name remains as a kind 
of generalized notion for all Kadyrov’s units and is rather broadly used by the local 
residents and “security structures”. ) Security Service was initially formed for the 
assurance of security of the Head of the Chechen Administration A. Kadyrov and had 
no legal status. Within three years, it became a powerful armed 
formation.  Throughout 2004–2005, the majority of the Security Service units became 
legalized within different structures of the Chechen Ministry of Interior, and namely, 
many of their members are serving today in the batallions of the Chechen Interior 
Ministry Internal Forces formed in 2006 named “Sever” [North] and “Yug” [South]. 
Besides “Kadyrovists” and the groups they control, Chechnya has battalions formed 
from Chechens named “Vostok” [East] (“Yamadyevists” – after the name of their 
leader Sulim Yamadayev) and “Zapad” [West] (“Kakiyevsts” – after the name of their 
leader Said-Magomed Kakiyev). These battalions are included in the 42
nd
 Motor Rifle 
Division of the RF Ministry of Defense. Besides ethnic Chechens there also serves a 
certain percentage of combatants sent from different regions of Russia. Throughout 
the last two years, the former members of the mentioned structures have taken all the 
key positions in the Chechen Ministry of Interior.  
  
The details about “chechenization” of the conflict can be found in the reports by the 
Legal Rights  Centers “The Chechen Republic: Consequences of “Chechenization” of 
the conflict, March 2006”; “In a Climate of Fear: “Political Process” and 
Parliamentary Elections in Chechnya; “Torture in Chechnya: normalization of a 
nightmare”, et al. 
You can find this in the Report by the Legal Rights  Center of  “Memorial” – 
“Conflict Spill-Over Outside the Chechen Republic in 2004-2005 (Ingushetia and 
Kabardino – Balkariya)”. 
The first Chechen war campaign of 1994-96 was euphemistically defined as 
“disarmament of illegal bandit formations” and “restoration of constitutional order” 
without any legal reasoning provided. On July 31, 1995, the RF Constitutional Court 
actually recognized the armed conflicts in Chechnya as armed conflicts on non-
international nature agreeing that these events fall under the Second Optional 
Protocol to the Jeneva Conventions. However, this fact did not entail any specific 
steps of the RF civil and military authorities. 
The relevant law on defense emergency (law on state of war) was adopted in 2002 
only. 
For details, please see the report “State Governance as an Antiterrorist Operation” , 
submitted by Lev Levinson, expert of the “Human Rights Institute”, delivered as a 
special submission to the Eminent Jurists Panel in January 2007 in connection with 
the high-level public hearings on terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights in 
Russia. 
Art. 205 of the RF Criminal Code was amended in July 2006.  
Thus, the armed rebellion is undertaken not for the purpose of violating public 
security or for the purpose of population intimidation, but “for the purpose of 
overthrowing or forcible change of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation 
or infringement of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (art. 279 of the 
RF Criminal Code).  
Absolute majority of the captured militants are accused under art. 208 of the RF 
Criminal Code (Organization of an Illegal Armed Formation or Participation in It) 
rather than under art. 205 (Terrorism – until July 2006, and Terrorist Act – as of 
July 2006 to the present). 
  
This case, as well as some other examples of non-selective bomb and missile attacks 
was described in detail in the Report by the Legal Rights Center of  “Memorial” – 
“Point Strokes. The non-selective use of force by the federal troops in the course of 
the armed conflict in Chechnнa in September - October 1999.” 
Basayev's house was destroyed, four militants were killed, Basayev himself remained 
safe. 
There were destroyed not less than five two-storey 12-apartment houses, one five-
storey block of apartments and a lot of one-floor private houses; the market and the 
taxi stand together with the cars were ruined; drivers and passengers were killed.  
That time Medka Isayeva’s two children and daughter-in-law were killed, she herself 
was wounded. Zina Yusupova was badly wounded. Libkan Bazayeva complained of 
moral damage and destruction of the property belonging to her family. 
The exit of the people and vehicles form Chechnya was resumed only on November 2, 
1999 
Zara Isayeva lost her son and three nephews during the bombing and gunfire in the 
village of Katyr-Yurt. 
Such was the information provided to the correspondents of the 1st and 2nd TV 
channels of Russian television by the officers responsible for this operation and, first 
of all, by major-general V. Shamanov, commander of the “Zapad” army group  
Art. 1 of the Protocol to the ECPHRFF (protection of property) was also found 
violated in the case of L. Bazayeva 
Like in the cases of England and Turkey earlier. 
Decisions on the cases of Isayeva, Bazayeva and Yusupova. 
Those guilty were not punished. The military procuracy closed the case on the ground 
that the house had been destroyed and people killed due to the actuation of the 
improvised explosive device. 
This statements does not correspond to the reality. The Gaytemirovs are relatives of 
Imar-ali Domayev whose wife and five children were killed on the farm of Rigakhoy 
on April 8, 2004. 
Three of them are presently living in the USA under the refugee status, others live in 
Ingushetia and Moscow 
See, for example the report by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” titled “Myths 
and Truth about Tsotsin-Yurt.” 
Response of the ChR Prosecutor’s Office to the inquiry made by the Legal Rights 
Center of “Memorial”, reference No 15/39-232-02 от 08.10.2002.: 
Order of the RF Minister of Interior V. Rushaylo No 1077 from 22.12. 1999  
The “filtration point” in the town of Argun was located in the quarry, in the village of 
Stary-Atagi – in the poultry farm, in the village of Chiri-Yurt – in the ruins of the 
cement factory 
The word combination of “filtration point” that the representatives of the federal 
forces in Chechnya used can be also found in the responses of the Prosecutor’s Office 
with no such phrase to be found in the Russian legislation. In 2005, the public learnt 
about the text of the so-called “Instructions on Planning and Preparation of Forces and 
Armament of Russia’s Ministry of Interior and Internal Security Agencies Attached to 
It for the Operations in the States of Emergency”, Annex No 1 to the Order of 
Russia’s Ministry of Interior from September 10, 2002 No 870. the order itself bears a 
stamp “for service use” and was not published anywhere. The 
“Instructions…”  prescribed creating FPs when holding special operations. The 
publication of the secret document proposing creation of the non-envisaged by the law 
detention places caused a scandal. As a result, through the order of the Minister of 
Interior, the text of “Instructions…” was modified and now contains no mentioning of 
the FPs. However, one cannot be sure that this definition is not used in other 
documents of the Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service that are not 
accessible for the public 
Response by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Argun Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office R. 
Tishin No 117 from February 12. 2002, to the inquiry by the Legal Rights Center of 
“Memorial” and the RF State Duma Deputies. 
  
“VOVD” is a structure within the RF Ministry of Interior performing, actually the 
functions of District Departments of the Ministry of Interior (ROVD) in the ChR 
territory. The VOVD officers are militiamen sent to work in Chechnya from different 
regions of Russia 
First of all, within the Bureau No 2 for Operative Investigation in the city of Groznyy, 
see below 
At the conference devoted to the issue of “Strengthening of Law Enforcement Bodies 
for Maintaining Law and Order in the Chechen Republic” held in Kislovodsk on the 
initiative of the CE’s Commissar on Human Rights. 
See the details in, for example, in the report by the Legal Rights Center of 
“Memorial” and the International Federation for Human Rights, “Torture in Chechnya: 
‘Normalization’ of  a Nightmare”) from 2006. 
For details, see the chapter “Issues of Tortures and Inhuman Treatment in Chechnya 
and Northern Caucuses” prepared by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and 
Center of “Demos” to be found in the Russia’s NGOs’ Alternative Report on the RF 
Compliance with the UN Convention against Torture presented at the 37 session of 
the UN Committee against Torture in autumn 2006 (http://www.demos-
center.ru/projects/6EE9B30/doklad). 
For details see the Report “Torture in Chechnya: ‘Normalization’ of  a Nightmare” 
prepared by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and the International Federation 
for Human Rights, as well as the chapter of “Issues of Tortures and Inhuman 
Treatment in Chechnya and Northern Caucuses” prepared by the Legal Rights Center 
of “Memorial” and Center of “Demos” to be found in the Russia’s NGOs’ Alternative 
Report on the RF compliance with the UN Convention against Torture presented at 
the 37 session of the UN Committee against Torture in autumn of 2006.    
We also include here the cases when the corpses of the “disappeared” people were 
found later. 
The Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” could monitor only a limited part, i.e. from 
one fourth to one third of the Republic’s territory. However, even in the monitored 
districts it is very unlikely that the registration of data was exhaustive. During the last 
few years, the monitored territory expanded, but in the situation of terror, people 
oftentimes refuse to provide data, which increases the kidnappings latency. Thus, in 
order to obtain a realistic picture, the number we have should by multiplied, according 
to different assessments, by two to four times. 
The last number is preliminary. Based on the specifics of the monitoring held in ChR, 
it will inevitably (and maybe considerably) grow up depending on the data obtained 
for the last year. 
These events were examined during the joint trip to the Northern Caucasus of the 
representatives of the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and the International 
Federation for Human Rights. 
One of the “Kaddyrov’s” structures 
The same can be said, by the way, about many other places of burial dumping and 
mass graves found in Chechnya 
The issue of hostage taking and reprisals in relation to the insurgents’ relatives is 
covered in the Report “Chechnya 2004: “New” Methods of Anti-Terror. Hostage 
Taking and Repressive Actions against Relatives of Alleged Combatants and 
Terrorists” prepared by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial”  
For more details about Elina Ersenoyeva’s kidnapping see the Open Letter to the ChR 
Public Prosecutor by the Helsinki Federation, the International Federation for Human 
Rights and the Center of “Demos” from August 18, 2006 and an Annex to it from 
August 25, 2006. (http://www.demos-
center.ru/projects/66D650D/7D16046/1160677528 and http://www.demos-
center.ru/projects/66D650D/7D16046/1156516907). 
See the chapter “Issues of Tortures and Inhuman Treatment in Chechnya and 
Northern Caucuses” prepared by the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and Center 
of “Demos” to be found in the Russia’s NGOs’ Alternative Report on the RF 
Compliance with the UN Convention against Torture presented at the 37 session of 
the UN Committee against Torture in autumn 2006    
Response to the inquiry by the RF Duma Deputy S.A. Kovalev 
Response to the inquiry by the RF Human Rights Commissioner V.P. Lukin 
Response to the inquiry by E.A. Pamfilova, Chair of the Civil Society Institutions and 
Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation  
As of now, Ulman’s case has been transferred for a new (third) examination by the 
court  
The issue of impunity is more closely addressed in the Report by the Legal Rights 
Center of “Memorial” and the International Federation for Human Rights “Torture in 
Chechnya: Normalization of a Nightmare, Report by the Legal Rights Center of 
“Memorial” “DECEPTIVE JUSTICE: Situation on the Investigation of Crimes 
against Civilians Committed by Members of the Federal Forces in the Chechen 
Republic During Military Operations of 1999-2003, as well as the chapter prepared by 
the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and the Center of “Demos” “Issues of 
Tortures and Inhuman Treatment in Chechnya and Northern Caucuses” prepared by 
the Legal Rights Center of “Memorial” and Center of “Demos” to be found in the 
Russia’s NGOs’ Alternative Report on the RF Compliance with the UN Convention 
against Torture presented at the 37 session of the UN Committee against Torture in 
autumn 2006  
 
